Capital accumulation models and dirigisme: a relational analysis of companies’ nationalizations in Argentina (1930-2018)

Abstract

In this paper we will analyze 275 companies’ nationalizations between 1930 and 2018 in Argentina, specifically observing their political use. The main hypothesis of this work is that a state acquisition can be a 'dirigiste nationalization' (used to regulate the market) or a 'rescue nationalization' (used, paradoxically, to save the market); the variable that can explain these different political uses is the capitalist accumulation model under which nationalizations have taken place: populist ISI, bureaucratic-authoritarian ISI, agro-populist, or financial valorization. To observe the relationship between accumulation models and nationalizations, we will use a 'relational' approach that gives special explicative importance to hegemonic fractions of the bourgeoisie in the power bloc, and to the incorporation or exclusion of the popular sectors. The methodology that we will use for the empirical analysis will be the elaboration of a Market Regulation Index (or political use of the nationalizations).